Former Austrian Foreign Minister turned director of the G.O.R.K.I. Center at St. Petersburg State University, Karin Kneissl, has sat down with TASS to discuss a wide array of themes, such as when a peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine might be ready, what challenges Kiev will face during elections, and whether Europe will once again become an important partner for Russia.
– Recently, US President Donald Trump openly declared for the first time the need for holding elections in Ukraine. What do you think: is it possible to hold them within 100 days - the timeframe reportedly discussed during the Berlin talks?
– Zelensky’s initial argument was that holding elections was impossible because the country was at war. In response, some American politicians pointed out that elections in the US were also held during wartime. Think what you want about the elections in Syria or Iraq, but in those countries, too, elections were held under very, very difficult conditions. What is necessary for elections? First and foremost, voter registration - that is, understanding who is on the lists and who is eligible to vote. Many people have fled Ukraine. I suspect that the main problem in holding elections will be voter registration - who is where and who can vote. On the one hand, there has been large-scale emigration, on the other, many voters have already died. Therefore, voter registration, in my opinion, is the biggest challenge in moving this process forward. I don't know how many days it will take, but that seems to me to be the key issue. Organizing ballot boxes, printing the actual ballots, and opening polling stations - I would say that's a lesser issue. Correct registration is far more important. Furthermore, for a legitimate election, all participating parties and candidates must be given equal opportunity to campaign. This means they need campaign posters and access to televised debates, although, of course, these days, election campaigns are largely conducted through social media. Nevertheless, posters are still necessary. Printing them and making related technical arrangements will undoubtedly be difficult, and this shouldn't be underestimated. Another serious problem for parties and candidates in Ukraine, in my opinion, will be access to funding, for example, to have equal airtime.
– Does Zelensky have a chance, and what future awaits him?
– I suspect that Vladimir Zelensky’s prospects are bleak. At a certain point, he promised the people something that he ultimately didn't deliver - and perhaps couldn't deliver. When he played a president on TV, he was more presidential than he ever was in real life. Zelensky is not alone in this respect. For me, someone like Emmanuel Macron is also an actor. I always say: he plays the president, but he's not the president. This, in my opinion, is a characteristic feature of our times - that in the case of federal chancellors or heads of state, in many European countries today, the main power lies with PR agencies and spin doctors. It is these people who "make" presidents. Zelensky was concocted by several such agencies. If I'm not mistaken, the head of his office, Yermak, was originally a film producer.
In 2019, when Zelensky won the election, he made a lot of promises, but in the end he delivered on none of them. With the loss of his head of office, Andrey Yermak, he essentially, in my opinion, lost the person who did all the dirty work. As an impartial onlooker I’ve got the impression that Zelensky devotes most of his time to media relations and is effectively unable to do any substantive work. I think Yermak was responsible for a significant portion of the preparation and paperwork. Now that Yermak is out, Zelensky is left with only 10 percent of what he used to be just recently.
– Do you think the peace treaty will likely be signed by someone other than Zelensky, and that another meeting between Putin and Zelensky is hard to imagine?
– Yes, because Zelensky’s signature, for a variety of reasons, certainly can't carry much weight. If he's re-elected - and that's also possible - then yes, he would be legitimized. But I don't want to discuss the elections in advance. Maybe he will be re-elected - yes. However, given how events are unfolding, I get the impression that Washington is exerting intense pressure to organize the elections. The current administration apparently understands the problem. Many American politicians already said this in the spring: of course, elections must be held. Russia isn’t alone in its position. Many people think the same way: some say it out loud, others don't.
You mentioned 100 days - that's about three months. I doubt that in the next three months, negotiations will be advanced to a point where a treaty can be truly agreed upon and all the necessary issues are resolved by consensus. I know Donald Trump is interested in getting this all done quickly, but I don't think a finalized peace treaty can materialize in two or three months. The document we have now is an agenda: it lists the topics, but we don't yet have details on how exactly it will be implemented.
– How long do you think it will take, after the Ukrainian conflict is resolved, for trust in that country to be restored internationally and for it to once again become a full-fledged, sovereign participant in international relations?
– This will depend very, very heavily on Ukraine's new territorial structure. I can well imagine that Ukraine's territory may still change significantly. It's also possible there will be a fundamentally new structure - more decentralized, with stronger federalism, with greater cultural or perhaps political autonomy for Russian-speaking regions. I'm talking specifically about Odessa and southern Ukraine.
I read a few days ago that Larry Fink, the head of BlackRock, a major American investment fund, is allegedly already involved in certain negotiating blocs. This is a rumor, of course, and needs to be verified. But the issue at stake is Ukraine, and its ores and minerals, as well as so-called strategic raw materials, that is, agricultural products. BlackRock is the largest investor in raw materials assets. There are also Chinese investors who are showing great interest in Ukraine’s farmland. Therefore, all of this will, of course, depend to a large extent on what kind of Ukraine we'll see in the future, what kind of government model it will have, and whether it will be a state with a clearly defined federal structure.
– Just recently, the European Union decided to freeze Russia's sovereign assets indefinitely. Isn't there a risk that this decision will leave Europe facing protracted legal proceedings and serious reputational damage?
– Yes, this goes without saying. This is outright theft or robbery. In this case, the European Union has ditched a number of its own rules and norms. Firstly, decisions within the councils of heads of state and government, foreign ministers, and finance ministers are made by consensus. There are areas in which decisions by majority vote are possible and are regulated at the supranational level, such as agriculture or competition issues. But certainly this procedure does not apply to such sensitive political issues. In this case, the European Union invoked Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which, to my recollection, allows for decisions by majority vote in exceptional situations. In doing so, Brussels has unwittingly brought to light serious macroeconomic problems. It is an admission of weakness. By invoking Article 122, the European Union effectively switched to decision-making by a majority vote. As a result, the positions of Hungary, Slovakia, and, to a certain extent, Belgium were essentially ignored, as the Belgian government was not enthusiastic about this decision.
Moreover, such a decision sends another signal - a signal of a violation not only of European law but also of customary international law. What is customary international law? It's the law of states, not explicitly codified anywhere, but which has evolved over centuries through the practice of mutual respect among states. This is about sovereign immunity. It has always been this way, so to speak. The EU has sent a signal to the world: we no longer respect the principle of state immunity, the rule that the assets of other states are inherently immune. It no longer matters - if we deem it necessary, we can feel free to expropriate them. This, frankly, is a very serious step.
– There have been media reports that the United States is discussing the possibility of creating a group to replace the G7, called the Core 5, which would include the United States, China, India, Japan, and Russia. As we can see, Europe is not there. Do you think such a group is feasible, and why, in your opinion, are these particular countries proposed as participants?
– These are serious actors economically, demographically, and politically. Japan was the world's second-largest economy for a very long time, until China overtook it. Japan still faces demographic challenges, as well as problems in the banking sector that began in the 1990s. But despite this, Japan is a crucial player from both the Russian and American perspectives, particularly in high technology. So, of course, Japan shouldn’t be taken lightly.
However, one could also put it this way: in the same fashion, perhaps, a country like South Korea, another technologically advanced country in Asia, could be considered. South Korea is undoubtedly just as important in terms of innovation, I would say. Japan undoubtedly plays a more significant role than South Korea. These countries simply reflect their respective weight.
As for Europe, it no longer plays any role at all. In considering this C5 platform, it would be completely obvious that Europe is no longer important. Then the seats on the UN Security Council could be redistributed. Because then, what's the point of France and the UK having veto power? I've said many times that the G7’s global weight has been waning in recent years. Why is Canada there, and why is Italy there? Of course, I respect Italy as an ancient cultural nation, but on the world stage, that doesn't matter.
And there are always two representatives from Brussels: the European Commission and the President of the EU Council. There are always two people representing Europeans - in addition to the European countries already there, such as the Germans, the British, and the French.
– In your opinion, will European states, after the conflict ends, stick to their current unconstructive approach in relations with Russia? Or will they quickly reorient themselves and return to their previous ties?
– Hatred is truly something much more than deep-rooted skepticism or mistrust; it is hatred of many things associated with Russia that is present in European society, and not just among the so-called elites. This feeling runs deep. In February 2022, everything didn't just start out of nowhere, like a bolt from the blue. Much had already gone wrong long before.
I also can't imagine at what level individual countries could be partners of interest to Russia, because as a gas buyer, a country like Germany will likely no longer be so interesting as before: it will no longer need as much gas. Its deindustrialization continues rapidly, the automobile industry is collapsing and the petrochemical industry is vanishing. The odds are, cooperation in its previous form will likely no longer be necessary.
The fact that it might once again become easier to obtain visas to visit Paris, Florence, Milan, and so on - yes, why not? Travelling will be fun again. I wish that all young people in Russia can once again enjoy the freedom of travel to Europe and see what belongs to the old educational canon of European cultural history. I hope this will become possible someday again. But I don't think future Europe will ever really matter as a truly important economic partner.