Former Austrian Foreign Minister and director of the G.O.R.K.l. Center at St. Petersburg State University, Karin Kneissl, in an interview with TASS, discussed whether Denmark could leave NATO over Greenland, the threat posed to the region by the escalation in Iran, and why the term "Donroe Doctrine" is appropriate in the situation with Venezuela.
– Do you believe that there are some external actors behind the protests in Iran?
– Yes, I share this view for several reasons. First, we see different forms of protest. There are peaceful protests, during which people quite rightly chant slogans against inflation and the loss of purchasing power. This isn't the first time something like this has happened. The problem of hunger has, in fact, become serious. We must also consider the large-scale water crisis in Iran, which has caused many farmers to migrate to cities due to the exodus of the rural population. And not just to Tehran, but to many provincial cities as well. This means that a new poverty group has emerged. The problem of poverty, the social issue as such - which is becoming more acute worldwide as people increasingly face a loss of purchasing power - is one of the causes. That is, we are seeing demonstrations against the government because of the dire economic situation. President Pezeshkian also said one thing very clearly: it's our fault. This is a crisis we ourselves have caused.
On the other hand, we are, of course, also seeing extremely violent protests, where instead of some slogans being chanted, we see aggression and violence. The way firefighters, security personnel, and other people are being attacked in the streets, lynched and burned is a sure sign this is no longer a protest, it's street violence, and extremely brutal at that. We have witnessed two different forms of protest. At least two, if not more: those who quite rightly, and not for the first time, raise the issue of the economic crisis, and those who act extremely, extremely brutally.
Whether it will ultimately be proven that some of these people are receiving money from abroad remains to be seen. But if we recall the events of June, against the backdrop of the escalating standoff between Israel and Iran, and then between Iran and the United States, the war and confrontation, then even before the missile strikes, as far as I recall, about 130 or even 200 Iranian nuclear specialists, along with their family members or employees, were killed. In some cases, that was done with explosive devices planted in their apartments or offices. This would have been impossible without the participation of spies, traitors, saboteurs - whatever you want to call them. After the June war, some of the dozens of suspected or already convicted spies were executed.
But what I honestly don't understand is why it remains so easy to plant spies in Iran. At the same time, people wrongly accused of espionage have been detained on numerous occasions. In other words, Iran's security apparatus isn't particularly effective. Moreover, the Iranian leadership and all levels of government, including regional ones, have been focused on issues of secondary importance in recent years. What do I mean by secondary issues? For example, the ban on dog walking, for which penalties have been introduced. It’s absolutely absurd. Or the issue of the mandatory headscarf - the requirements have now been relaxed, but for a long time, various pseudo-religious norms and moral issues took center stage while serious social problems remained unaddressed.
To put it in a nutshell, what is currently happening in Iran is a combination of problems created within the country, on the one hand, and problems that were undoubtedly imported, on the other. There is no black-and-white picture here: there are many shades of gray in this situation that must be considered.
The large-scale water crisis is particularly shocking, as it effectively makes farming impossible in some regions. In the summer, there were even speculations about evacuating the capital, Tehran, because the authorities could no longer provide the population with drinking water. This is also partly the result of internal failures, as water resource management issues were never seriously addressed and considerable amounts of water were recklessly wasted. At the same time, it is partly due to temperature fluctuations, climate extremes, and other factors.
Therefore, even here, one cannot reduce everything to a simple black-and-white explanation. However, the fact that external interference is taking place is obvious. This has happened many times in Iran's history. But, in my opinion, this doesn't excuse anything.
– Could the destabilization of Iran lead to a loss of stability in other countries in the region?
– Hardly a single country in the region can be called truly stable these days. For example, I have no idea how stable Iraq is right now. Yes, fortunately, Iraq is not the kind of country it was 20 years ago: the situation there was extremely dire between 2006 and 2008. But if we look at Iran's neighbors - say, Afghanistan - can we call it stable? That's a highly debatable question.
I would say that Iran, on the one hand, suffers from instability in neighboring countries. It's enough to recall, for example, the Afghan drug trafficking industry. The problem of drugs and drug smuggling in Iran is colossal. Furthermore, Iran has undoubtedly been affected by the events in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003. Without Iran's participation, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, listed as a terrorist organization and banned in Russia – TASS) would not have been defeated in Iraq. The Iranians played a crucial role there. And in 2020, the US assassinated Iranian General [Qassem] Soleimani in Baghdad.
Therefore, I would say that instability – or, let's say, fragility – has always been a distinguishing feature of the region: everything there is, to a certain extent, extremely vulnerable. No matter what happens in Iran itself – we don't know – chaos within the country, in my opinion, would first and foremost trigger large-scale refugee flows. If anarchy or a major military conflict breaks out, as we saw last June, people will naturally choose to leave Tehran. Whether these people will become internally displaced or cross borders – time will tell. But chaos, of course, is quite possible.
– Do you think Iran will be able to survive this situation?
– I won’t dare make any forecasts. This is far from the first time the country has seen violent protests and equally harsh repression. However, this time the level of violence on the part of the demonstrators is higher. Perhaps - and this is my personal guess - this is due to the emergence of a new generation.
I remember well the protests in Iran that occurred, I think, in December 2002. [Mohammad] Khatami was president then. He had made many promises to his voters, but failed to fulfill them. The people took to the streets asking: "Where are our rights?" They were specifically talking about rights. Economic demands weren't yet on the agenda. Now economic problems are the issue of the day. Social issues weren't as pressing in 2002. Back then, people were truly concerned about civil rights and freedom. Those protests in December 2002 were suppressed with extreme brutality. What followed were effectively show trials with extremely harsh sentences.
Young colleagues were telling me that the level of repression back then was such that there was a lull for a while. Then, when protests against [former Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad began - I think it was 2010, after he was re-elected - there were serious protests against his re-election. I got the impression back then that outside forces were already actively intervening. I don't think this happened in 2002, but during the protests against Ahmadinejad after his re-election, when people took to the streets shouting "I didn't vote for him," "Not my president" - this slogan was later used in other countries - I'm almost certain that foreign actors were already at work.
Now, 20 years later, we're witnessing a process of societal hardening all over the world. The way lynchings are happening on the streets today, in my opinion, has less to do with Iran specifically than with the general brutality that is, unfortunately, increasingly evident among the younger generation.
– And in other countries too?
– Yes, absolutely. Just look at the United States - how brutal and violent street the clashes there are today. Or take Israel - the way people are treated there. In this protracted tragedy of Palestine and Israel - and I lived there for two years - there have never been the outbreaks of violence we are witnessing today. Israel's 1982 Lebanon war was brutal, but nowhere near as brutal as what's happening now.
I can't say for sure where this comes from. Perhaps it's a matter of the general brutalization of society, the breaking of taboos, which seem to be happening naturally. Perhaps this is because many see things more like a video game than reality: when people are killed remotely by drones, as the Israelis are doing, or when food supplies are blocked, and so on.
At the same time, I remember well the numerous waves of protests in Iran. If we compare the events of 2002, then, I think, 2018, as well as the protests against the mandatory headscarf several years ago, we can say that, undoubtedly, external players were already present there. However, all of this needs to be approached with proper nuancing. I would say that the current protests are a result of a confluence of many factors. There is no simple black-and-white distinction.
Do you see a risk of more Israeli military strikes against Iran?
Absolutely. The Israelis themselves are saying this - it's no longer just our assumptions. [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu has stated this more than once, as have other cabinet members. If Iran advances its research again to the point where it can enrich uranium for military purposes, then, according to Netanyahu - if I remember the wording correctly - Israel will consider itself justified in striking Iran again.
What President Trump called the "12-Day War" in June was essentially a kind of temporary ceasefire, including against the backdrop of the Israelis' problems.
– The second important topic of our conversation concerns US-Venezuela relations. What happened there on January 3rd was unthinkable. Why do you think Venezuela is so important to the United States? Is it solely about oil?
– Natural resources always play a role to some degree. It's enough to put on "oil market glasses" to understand why much of the world operates the way it does. But Venezuela, like other Caribbean and Latin American countries, is also what the United States has long called its "backyard." "Not in my backyard" - it's their hemisphere, their backyard.
It's no coincidence that the media now frequently recalls the Monroe Doctrine - or rather, makes references to it. [US President James] Monroe essentially ousted other players from North and South America, declaring: "This is our realm of influence, the United States rules the roost here." Previously, of course, other players were present. Today, people generally talk about a certain "Donroe Doctrine" - replacing the letter M in President Monroe's name with a D, for Donald. In other words, much here is still tied to that old US geopolitical stance: this is their hemisphere. And this has been the case under virtually every American administration - and it's tied to the electorate.
It's important to remember that Hispanic voters in the US - those from Cuba, Mexico, El Salvador, and other countries - represent an extremely important and growing group. I can't give you an exact percentage right now, but in a number of states, their influence is colossal. If you take, for example, a politician like Marco Rubio - the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, a man who combines two positions and, according to the press, is also "assigned" to deal with Cuba and so on - then for such politicians, the priorities in this region are completely obvious. They naturally devote far more attention to it than, say, the situations in Egypt, Iran, or Ukraine. This is natural. Just as in the European Union, there will always be one position or another regarding Russia - good or bad - while in reality, only a few countries, like Portugal or Spain, are really interested in Venezuela, because they have expatriates there, that is, citizens living in the country.
In other words, much of this has to do with the demographic structure. Yes, resources play a role, but I believe there's much more to it than that. If I may, I'd like to conclude this thought as follows. Personally, I always say "the United States," not "America," and I say "the US economy." Most people simply say "America." Even Americans themselves constantly use the slogan "Make America Great Again." But America, the Americas, is a continent. There is North, Central, and South America. On this continent, there is, in particular, the United States of America. But there are also Caribbean states, Canada, and other countries. I deliberately and consistently use the words "USA," "the States," or "US citizens," rather than "Americans," because I'm trying to emphasize that we're talking about a continent. However, from the US perspective, it's often conveniently reduced to the formula "It's all America."
– In your opinion, who and under what conditions could oppose US policy in this hemisphere?
– No single country is capable of this alone. Brazilian President Lula is doing everything he can, but in my opinion, he won't succeed alone. If we look at the positions of other, more influential countries, we see a very disparate picture. For example, Argentine President [Javier] Milei applauds Washington. President [Luis Inacio] Lula [da Silva] criticizes it. If [Jair] Bolsonaro were still president of Brazil, Brazil would probably applaud the US, too. So here, too, the situation is far from black-and-white.
We have been talking a lot about BRICS, but BRICS is a forum, not an organization. BRICS has no mechanisms. Dozens of seminars and conferences are held, but they are still just a platform for dialogue. There is no BRICS Secretary-General who could say: we are now introducing certain measures. This simply does not exist. Therefore, given how the situation is unfolding today, I sometimes get the feeling that Trump can act virtually without restraint. Take China's reaction, for example: if we look at the People's Republic of China, a statement was issued by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But not by President Xi Jinping - which, of course, is understandable. If I were the Chinese leader, I probably wouldn't react personally either. However, Trump pursues a truly personalized policy. This means that if someone wants to respond to him, they essentially have to respond at the same level. As a result, we see statements from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, press releases from here and there - but what has actually happened?
– Is there a possibility that international institutions or courts will try to resist Washington's will?
– More than twenty years ago, I was teaching international law at an American university. Back then, with some irony, I called the course "What remains of international law." I felt a little awkward telling my students, "This is my introduction to international law," because by the 1990s - after the Kosovo War, then against the backdrop of the "war on terror" and other events - much of this field had been destroyed and turned upside down.
I constantly had discussions with American colleagues and students - not all of them were US citizens; we had many students from Eastern Europe; it was, so to speak, a university for wealthy young people. I especially often argued with young Americans, who would tell me outright: "There is no such thing as international law, we don't care." These young people were telling me this 24 years ago. I had to work hard to explain the rules, norms, and very essence of international law, to defend the idea that there is sense in it. Because if all these norms were simply thrown out the window, chaos would ensue. As I said, they were "just" students and professors. Today, we have a US president who is essentially saying, "International law doesn't exist for me." It's crystal clear. We're dealing with a near-anarchic state at a higher level. If we look at Europe's reaction, we see either applause or silence. For example, former Austrian Chancellor [Sebastian] Kurz declared that everything that was happening was simply wonderful.
When I was foreign minister and the issue of Venezuela arose - when Parliament Speaker [Juan] Guaido was nominated against [Nicolas] Maduro and the EU debated whether we should now recognize Guaido instead of Maduro - I tried to explain to my colleagues and my own government: according to international law, we recognize states, not governments. Which government is in office in this or that capital is a matter for the people to decide. Of course, various internal factors can influence this, but these are the internal affairs of the state. We don't recognize governments - we recognize states.
Today we see and hear the European Union say, "Well, we don't recognize Maduro, and that seems fine." It's either silence or applause. Yet, there's one crucial element in international law - how the law is formed in the first place. It's practice. How is international law created? Through practice, through custom: when several states take certain actions with the intention of creating a legal norm.
Why do the UN or the International Committee of the Red Cross so frequently and so forcefully protest, for example, against Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories? Because it violates international law. Yes, the Israelis continue to act this way. Clearly, no one can stop them. But protest is necessary, because without protest, it becomes standard practice. What we're seeing today - I may be exaggerating a bit - is that if it becomes possible to kidnap a president from his own country, and Trump himself said, "It could happen to anyone," then without protest, it will become the new norm, the new practice.
Then we find ourselves in a place where, in our region, we've gone back to the Viking Age. The Vikings did exactly that: they attacked settlements, kidnapped women, beheaded chieftains and took children hostage. That was in the 10th and 11th centuries. A thousand years have passed, and we're back to square one. The Mongols and others operated somewhat differently: they charged fees, received tribute for a certain level of protection. The kidnapping of leaders - if you can call it that, the abduction of a "head" – has happened in human history before. It's not unprecedented. However, over the last 400–500 years, we have developed certain norms - for example, in maritime law - that have allowed for international trade and ensured the possibility of interaction even in wartime.
I've been warning for years that we risk sliding back into the pre-modern era. For me, as a person from Central Europe, modernity began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 - it was a kind of new beginning. Of course, one can debate modernity, nationalism and the like. But I'm deeply troubled by the form in which archaic behavior is tolerated today. Because it's not just that the US is doing this - others are largely silent. There's an old Latin saying: Qui tacet, videtur consentire - "He who remains silent seems to agree." This, incidentally, is also a legal principle: silence can effectively mean accepting a treaty or recognizing a certain situation. This is precisely the extreme danger of the processes unfolding today.
– If we talk about Greenland and the possible purchase or acquisition of Greenland by the United States - could this also be considered an archaic approach?
– It's both archaic and not archaic at the same time. As far as I understand, a bill was introduced in the US Congress - I haven't seen it, only read about it - that would "annex" Greenland as the 51st state of the United States. In 2018, Trump said he wanted to buy Greenland. Then, after returning to the presidency, he declared he wanted to conquer it. Now, perhaps, we're talking about concluding a treaty so tight that Greenland will de facto become the 51st US state.
After all, we hear Trump say every few days that this is "vital to national security." Over the past 10-15 years, everyone has realized that another "Klondike," another, so to speak, golden West, is in the North. So, it's no longer "go west," or "go east," but "go north." For Trump, the region's geostrategic position is crucial: he constantly talks about the Chinese and Russian ships stationed there, about natural resources, about the Arctic passage. This territory is so important to him that I don't think he'll easily give it up.
How exactly this will play out, I don't know for sure. Whether a confrontation with Denmark will arise - verbal or otherwise—is anyone’s guess. But in a sense, this is also an archaic situation. On the other hand, it's not entirely archaic, because similar forms of purchasing concessions and establishing the closest possible cooperation have existed before in history. The British, for example, did the same thing through their East India Company: they entered into trade agreements and then, over time, annexed these states. This was colonialism – not something archaic, but precisely colonialism. It was an era that is partially over, but partially not.
But kidnapping presidents - for me, that's no longer colonial or imperial behavior. For me, it's archaic. It's like the Vikings seizing some chieftain and saying, "We're taking this one with us." Whatever you say, I simply can't think of a word other than "archaic."
– Could the Greenland situation lead to a split within NATO, or even a withdrawal by one of the parties from the alliance?
– Yes, the Danish government has already indicated that such a risk exists.
– Is there a possibility that Greenland will become a bargaining chip in the context of the Ukrainian issue? After all, the Arctic issue was already raised during the talks in Anchorage.
– As far as I recall, the Russian side then proposed trilateral cooperation - by the US, China, and Russia - with joint investments and technological collaboration. Ideally, if one can put it that way, this would be the best-case scenario. However, I don't think such an ideal approach is realistic.
As for whether this could be linked to the Ukraine negotiations, I doubt it. These are, after all, different matters. The question is how to resolve the extremely complex Ukrainian issue: from territorial issues to language, church affairs, monitoring, and so on. It's a vast and extremely challenging field. Another, theoretically simpler, issue is potential future cooperation between the US and Russia, for example, in the Arctic. This, in essence, could be relatively straightforward.
But the Ukrainian issue still seems extremely difficult and tragic to me. Let's say "dossier" isn't quite the right word here. I'd call it a tragedy.