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Russian official on Moscow’s nuclear doctrine: ‘Not a menu that changes every week’

Alexander Venediktov stressed that Russia’s state policy on nuclear deterrence "exhaustively documents conditions for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia"

MOSCOW, October 13. /TASS/. Russia’s nuclear doctrine, like all strategic planning documents, takes into account a variety of scenarios and the very fact of a change in the international situation does not require its adjustment, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Alexander Venediktov said in an interview with TASS.

When asked if any changes are planned to the Russian nuclear doctrine, given that its current version was approved in mid-2020, he replied:

"Strategic planning documents are not a menu in a restaurant that can be reprinted every week. Their development is based on a variety of scenarios, every little thing is calculated, every detail is verified, so changing the situation does not mean automatically adjusting doctrines. This also applies to the state policy framework in the field of nuclear deterrence."

The official stressed that Russia’s state policy on nuclear deterrence "exhaustively documents conditions for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia."

"This is the difference between our doctrine and the US Nuclear Posture Review. Everything is clearly spelled out in ours, but in their document, it is vague, incomprehensible. Experts still cannot fully understand in which cases the Americans reserve the right to strike, including preventive ones," Venediktov said.

He also noted that the US Nuclear Posture Review was adopted under President Donald Trump, and the current White House administration "still cannot develop its own version, publication has been postponed many times."

According to the Russian nuclear doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is possible only if the enemy uses this or other types of weapons of mass destruction against the Russian Federation and its allies, if there is reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles to attack Russia and its allies, if the enemy influences the objects necessary for retaliatory actions of nuclear forces, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.