MOSCOW, October 6. /TASS/. Slovenia will not support the confiscation of Russia’s frozen sovereign funds in the EU during the upcoming discussion on the topic; the impact of Lula da Silva’s potential defeat in the presidential election on Brazil and relations with Russia; and youth protests in Spain and Europe that could lead to the collapse of governments. These stories topped Tuesday’s newspaper headlines across Russia.
Izvestia: Slovakia to oppose seizure of Russian assets in EU
Bratislava does not support the confiscation of Russia’s sovereign funds frozen in the EU. Earlier, a group of European lawmakers called for the seizure of approximately 200 billion euros in Russian assets from the Belgian depository Euroclear, with the intention of using them to support Ukraine. According to Izvestia’s sources, the use of frozen funds will be discussed at foreign ministers’ and EU leaders’ meetings in mid-October. Experts believe that reaching a consensus on this issue will be extremely difficult, so a decision will likely be postponed, especially since EU financial institutions are concerned about potential retaliatory measures by Russia.
Slovakia opposes the confiscation of Russia’s sovereign assets frozen in the EU, Lubos Blaha, deputy head of the ruling SMER (Direction - Social Democracy) party and a member of the European Parliament, told Izvestia. "As far as Slovakia is concerned, our position is unequivocal: we do not support confiscation, nor any involvement by Slovakia that would entail any financial obligations for our country," he told Izvestia. According to the politician, the essence of the discussions in the EU is "how to steal Russian money while avoiding severe punishment."
Slovakia’s cautious stance stems from the fact that Prime Minister Robert Fico is seeking a peaceful settlement of the conflict and refuses to fund military supplies to Kiev, political analyst Ilya Shcherbakov emphasized. In addition, Slovakia receives oil and gas from Russia, which is why it opposes Brussels’ plans to phase out Russian resources by 2027. According to Mikhail Vedernikov, a leading researcher at the Europe Institute under the Russian Academy of Sciences, Bratislava fears a disruption of the stability of the EU’s financial system. The expert told Izvestia that actions targeting Russian assets could set a dangerous precedent.
However, Vedernikov noted that Bratislava is unlikely to be able to resist pressure from Brussels if the confiscation scenario is backed by leading EU countries, including Belgium. The expert pointed out that, given the EU’s limited ability to finance the conflict in Ukraine, a decision to use Russian assets will still be made, if not now then in the future. Shcherbakov, on the other hand, stressed that a decision on the fate of Russian assets will be delayed as long as possible and is unlikely to come anytime soon. It is important to note that Slovakia is not alone in its position. Bulgaria may side with it; since Prime Minister Rumen Radev took office, Bulgaria has favored a diplomatic settlement. Last December, Andrej Babis, who regained his post as head of the Czech government, also spoke out against the seizure of Russian assets.
Vedomosti: What Lula da Silva’s potential defeat in Brazilian elections entails for Russia
Flavio Bolsonaro, a 45-year-old senator and son of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023), who is currently serving a 25-year prison sentence, edged out the country’s incumbent leader, 80-year-old Lula da Silva, in the first round of the presidential election by a narrow margin of 47% to 45.16%. The results, published on the website of Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court on October 5, showed Bolsonaro ahead of Lula, who served his first presidential term from 2003 to 2011. The second round of voting will take place on October 25.
The results for the head of state’s party were also disappointing. The Liberal Party, led by Flavio Bolsonaro, won a majority of districts in the parliamentary and gubernatorial elections. Notably, Flavio’s younger brothers, 43-year-old Carlos and 28-year-old Renan, were elected to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, respectively. In addition, Flavio’s stepmother and Brazil’s former first lady, 44-year-old Michelle Bolsonaro, also won a seat in the Senate.
Lula da Silva and Flavio Bolsonaro take different approaches to both domestic and foreign policy. Lula’s more socially oriented approach contrasts with the Bolsonaro camp’s drive to deregulate the economy and streamline social programs. In terms of foreign policy, Lula focuses on diversifying international ties, including through the development of BRICS, while Bolsonaro, like his father, focuses on strengthening ties with Washington.
Lula da Silva lost to Flavio Bolsonaro on the voters’ main priorities: the economy and security, political analyst Pavel Dubravsky told Vedomosti. In addition, Bolsonaro is a much more active and dynamic candidate. At the same time, the expert acknowledged that Lula’s team might ultimately find it easier to narrow the gap with Bolsonaro’s supporters than Bolsonaro’s team will find it easy to expand their lead.
Brazil is yet another South American country where the pendulum may swing to the right again, cementing US control over the Western Hemisphere, Pavel Koshkin, a senior researcher at the US and Canadian Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted. According to him, a Bolsonaro victory would give President Donald Trump the opportunity to argue that his approaches remain in demand around the world and, therefore, within the US itself.
Izvestia: Youth protests spiraling out of control in Europe
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s October 5 decision to call for early elections is unlikely to quell the tide of discontent sparked by the housing crisis, experts noted. Youth protests quickly grew into nationwide demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people. Now a similar chain of events is unfolding in France. It began with high school students protesting their educational conditions, and they were later joined by teachers and civil servants. This could lead to the resignation of the Sebastien Lecornu government and even the dissolution of the National Assembly, the lower house of the French parliament.
The protests in Spain and France have one thing in common: the feeling among European youth that they cannot live normal lives right now, only in some abstract future. In Spain, the main issue behind the protests is the unaffordability of housing: rent is rising much faster than incomes. In France, the protests were sparked by student demonstrations against teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms, and run-down school buildings. Essentially, however, it's the same story of deteriorating basic living conditions, dissatisfaction with the quality of public services, and the social vulnerability of the younger generation.
Commenting on the situation, Russian Center for European Information Director Nikolay Topornin emphasized that the housing crisis in Spain was merely one of the triggers of widespread discontent, but not its root cause. According to the political scientist, the migration crisis in Ceuta and relentless energy price hikes are further worsening the country’s domestic political situation.
In France, the situation has escalated to the point where the agenda now includes either the resignation of Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu’s government or the dissolutionn of the National Assembly. Under the French Constitution, Macron currently has two options at his disposal: appoint a new prime minister or call for early parliamentary elections, Maria Frolova, a research fellow at the World Military Economy and Strategy Institute at the Russian National Research University Higher School of Economics, told Izvestia. At the same time, experts tend to believe that Macron is more likely to replace the head of the cabinet in order to ease public and political pressure and buy time until the 2027 presidential election.
Vedomosti: Europe doubles its military spending over past five years
The combined military spending of European countries will rise by 15% in 2026, reaching 574 billion euros. This is a 103% increase from 2021, when spending was 283 billion euros, according to data from SIPRI and NATO reviewed by Vedomosti. This year, military spending in Europe has climbed to 2.55% of GDP, up from 1.64% five years ago. It is important to note that this figure represents only direct defense spending. NATO countries will allocate an additional 1.4% of GDP to related investments in military infrastructure and security. To cover all this spending, officials have had to dip into Europeans’ pockets, raising taxes, increasing public debt and its servicing costs, and even reducing social spending.
European spending is growing from a lower baseline than that of the US, and Europe has also borne the bulk of the costs of supporting Ukraine, international relations expert Vasily Kashin emphasized. In 2022, for example, Europe allocated 16 billion euros in military aid to Kiev while the US provided 21 billion euros. By 2025, however, the US had reduced its funding to zero. Europeans covered the difference, increasing aid to 33 billion euros, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. The equipment continues to be American but is almost entirely financed by the Europeans.
In line with key strategic programs such as the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, worth 800 billion euros, Europe is actively redirecting its industry toward military production, military expert Alexander Stepanov noted. However, militarization is a poor driver of economic growth, since the goods and services produced do not feed back into production, Kashin pointed out. Investments in the defense sector create jobs, stimulate industrial production, and support technological development; therefore, in the short term, they can have a positive impact on GDP, economic expert Pavel Sevostyanov stressed. Nevertheless, investments in transport infrastructure, digitalization, energy, or industrial modernization raise the productivity of the entire economy, whereas a significant portion of military production does not create additional value, he explained.
The ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 should make Europe feel capable of independently conducting military deterrence against Russia by that date, reducing its critical dependence on the US, Kashin pointed out. But it was American corporations that benefited most from the rearmament in Europe, since it relied on US technology, such as the purchase of F-35 fighter jets, Patriot air defense systems, and information infrastructure, Demokrit Zamanapulov, a senior research fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted. The transfer of equipment and ammunition to Ukraine further depleted European arsenals and forced the purchase of new models from the US, he concluded.
Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Reasons why Russia remains in OPEC+ alliance
The recent decision of OPEC+ to keep oil production quotas unchanged has had virtually no impact on the global market. Oil prices are moving independently in response to geopolitical developments, statements from the US and Iran, tanker freight rates, and China’s oil import statistics, but not in response to the alliance’s actions. This is so obvious that questions arise as to whether the organization has become futile and whether Russia should remain in OPEC+, as well as about the inevitable and imminent collapse of the alliance. While there are reasons for this opinion, it is also worth considering that the market will not remain in this state forever.
For instance, DA Consulting CEO Daniil Tyun told Rossiyskaya Gazeta that the influence of OPEC+ on oil prices is currently weaker than usual. However, the reason is not that the alliance has lost control of the market.
Rather, the main factors driving prices today are geopolitics and logistics, not quotas. The physical volume of oil is gradually returning to the market, but delivery remains expensive and risky. Insurance costs have surged, and tanker freight rates on certain routes have reached record highs. In addition, the risk of attacks on ships persists. Therefore, the price per barrel is now determined by both how much oil is produced and how safe and expensive it is to deliver it to the buyer. Once the crisis in the Middle East is over, the influence of OPEC+ on the global market should grow again.
Nevertheless, if the alliance collapses, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, and other major producers will begin competing by increasing production and exports, Tyun emphasized. Russia is one of the world’s largest oil producers, but after 2022, Moscow will have little ability to quickly redirect its oil exports. Russia has only two major buyers: China and India. In this context, a price war among the largest oil producers poses a particularly serious threat to Moscow. Therefore, it remains economically rational for Russia to participate in OPEC+. While Russia’s withdrawal from OPEC+ would allow it to formally lift production limits, it would also deprive Moscow of a mechanism for collectively managing global supply, the expert noted.
It should be noted that Russia already has room to increase production given its current output is below OPEC+ quotas. Increasing production by one million barrels per day in just a couple of months is unlikely; it will take at least six months. Therefore, it makes sense to revisit the question of the rationality of Russia's participation in OPEC+ only when the alliance's quotas genuinely restrict domestic oil production and hinder exports.
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