The changes in the Russian nuclear doctrine announced by President Vladimir Putin are due to the deterioration of the military-political situation in the world and new threats and security challenges to the Russian Federation, Igor Korotchenko, Editor-in-Chief of the National Defense Journal writes.

It is clear that the beginning of the special military operation (in Ukraine) and the creation of a western coalition of Russian military adversaries who back Ukraine have created absolutely new security challenges and threats.

The key factor of the updated doctrine is that Russia retains the right for a retaliatory nuclear strike in response to an aggression with conventional forces and arms against it. Besides, the aggression can come from a non-nuclear country backed by a nuclear power. We believe that if NATO begins combat actions against Russia collectively or in a coalition or by a single non-nuclear country, Russia can retaliate by engaging nuclear weapons.

Russia did not plan it before, but now the doctrine allows it. What does it mean? For instance, it is the deployment by Poland of a military contingent in Ukraine and its engagement in combat against Russia or if Romania and Poland begin to down Russian aircraft or cruise missiles over Ukraine. Moscow will consider it an aggression from the point of view of the international law and will have the right to engage nuclear weapons against military targets in the mentioned countries.

If the United States delivers a strike at us with air or seaborne cruise missiles, we shall now consider it a casus belli and can retaliate by nuclear weapons at the USA. It is the supreme commander-in-chief to decide whether strikes by long-range precision US or UK missiles deep in Russia from the territory of Ukraine should be considered a casus belli. He will decide how Russia would react in any specific case and which weapons – conventional or nuclear - to engage.

It is a completely new development, which was not listed in the previous doctrine. In case of a NATO collective or single-country aggression against Russia with conventional weapons, we shall consider the US, the UK and France to be the three nuclear allies. No strikes with conventional cruise missiles deep in Russia are possible without US planning, intelligence, and satellite navigation. Therefore, Russia will consider it a possibility for nuclear retaliation.

The same concerns Belarus, a member of the Union State with Russia. We have common military planning and defense space. In case of an aggression against Belarus from Poland or Lithuania with the use of conventional weapons, Russia will retain the right for a nuclear retaliatory strike at the mentioned countries, at their military facilities and intruding forces.

These are completely new updates in the doctrine, which also has the confidential part where the situations for the use of nuclear weapons are described in detail. The main change is the possibility of a nuclear response to any aggression against Russia with any types of weapons. Russia will decide whether to engage tactical or strategic nukes depending on specific military-political situation.

The West should not tell us it is another red line or a message to it. We are sending no signals to anyone. Time is ripe for practical actions.

The Russian General Headquarters has received corresponding instructions and began planning potential options of operations proceeding from new realities. It demands major organizational and operational effort to decide which nuclear weapons have to be engaged and where.

Russia possesses strategic nuclear forces. I believe the new conditions call for the creation of a command to deal with non-strategic nuclear forces.

The recent exercise of the non-strategic nuclear forces trained the handover of nuclear charges from the warehouses of the 12th main department of the Defense Ministry to the troops. They trained delivery, docking with carriers, technical checks, issue of corresponding command and combat training engagement.

It is to be decided whether several missile brigades armed with Iskander-M launchers should be already armed with tactical nukes or not. The issue is very sensitive and demands major planning. It is to be decided how the command to engage tactical nukes will be issued in various conditions. It is possible that the adversary will deliver a large-scale Prompt Global Strike at Russia to destroy its military command system and the top military-political leadership. The technologies of a retaliatory strike in such a force majeure should be known. The General Headquarters has to consider it all in detail, and submit for approval by the Russian Security Council and the president.

It is necessary to think now how it will happen. There may be no time for the handover of tactical nukes from the 12th department to the troops in conditions of a rapidly developing and unpredictable situation. These are major issues and the Russian General Headquarters has to respond to them.

As for Russian strategic nuclear weapons, they are on a constant combat duty. The launch command system has been numerously streamlined and is in a proper combat order.

The current nuclear doctrine was approved in June 2020 and replaced the predecessor that was in force for a decade.
 

By Igor Korotchenko,

Military observer, Editor-in-Chief of the National Defense Journal, Director of the Center for Analysis of Global Arms Trade

 

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