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Some Iranian nuclear program control measures may be cancelled in 2-3 years — source

If Iran fulfills its obligations and the international community has confidence in Iran’s serious intention to fulfil them, then part of the excess mechanisms may be cancelled, a source says

VIENNA, September 14. /TASS/. A number of redundant control measures over the Iranian nuclear program, envisaged by the agreement between Tehran and the six major powers (five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) may be cancelled in 2-3 years, a diplomatic source in one of the "sextet" delegations told TASS on Monday on the sidelines of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA).

"If Iran fulfills its obligations and the international community has confidence in Iran’s serious intention to fulfil them, then part of the excess mechanisms may be cancelled," he said, adding that they are the control mechanisms that go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

According to the diplomat, the corresponding decision should be taken at the ministerial and approved by the Joint Commission [created as part of the agreement]. "There is a certain mechanism to check the agreement’s fulfilment, which provides for a ministerial meeting a couple of years," he added.

Iran and the countries of the "sextet" reached an agreement upon a comprehensive joint action plan in Vienna on July 14. It aims to resolve all the issues around Iran’s nuclear programme, secure its peaceful nature and ensure lifting of all sanctions on Tehran.

Under the agreement, Iran is committed to the execution of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which regulates, among other things, inspectors’ access to facilities in Iran. In addition, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) spells out Iran’s voluntary measures.

Tehran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including online enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years.